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A
mAbstract
The reduction of early school leaving to less than 10 percent of the relevant
population by 2020 is a headline target in the Europe 2020 strategy and one of the
five benchmarks of the strategic framework for European cooperation in education
and training. Designing adequate policies to combat early school leaving is a difficult
task that requires both the identification of causal links and the measurement of
costs and benefits. In this paper, we review the issues surrounding the measurement
of the costs of early school leaving to individuals and societies and examine several
implemented policies that are expected to affect early school leavers. These include
broad policies – such as changes in minimum school leaving age, tracking and
school resources – as well as more targeted policies. While our focus is mainly on
Europe, we also consider important evidence from across the Atlantic.
JEL Classification: J24.
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According to the definition used by Eurostat and the European Commission, early
school leaving occurs when an individual aged 18 to 24 has attained at most lower sec-
ondary education and is not engaged in education and training.1 In 2009, 14.4% of the
European population (EU-27) was in this condition, with some countries close to the
10 percent mark (Austria, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Sweden, Czechia,
Poland and Slovenia) and other countries very far from this mark (Spain, Portugal,
Italy, and – somewhat surprisingly - Norway and Iceland).
What are the individual and social costs of early school leaving? In a frictionless
economy, where individuals are free to choose their optimal level of education and the
effects of individual choice do not spill over into society at large, this question makes little
sense: the level of education each of us chooses or has chosen is both privately and socially
optimum. In practice, however, economies and societies are far from frictionless, and
optimal choice may be restrained both by the presence of credit constraints – both short
and long term – and by other market frictions. Moreover, since individual choice has
effects that are typically ignored when choosing education, there are externalities driving a
wedge between the social and private costs and returns to education.
Many view early school leaving as a serious economic and social phenomenon that
has important consequences both on individuals and on society. The recent economic
literature has highlighted that the benefits of education are broad (see Oreopoulos and
Salvanes 2011). For individuals, education generates benefits not only because itBrunello and De Paola; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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to more informed decisions affecting health, marriage, parenting and retirement.
Moreover, schooling affects individual non-cognitive skills and attitudes, such as risk
aversion, patience and motivation, that influence economic choices. Individual deci-
sions to undertake further education have social consequences and affect both state fi-
nances - by raising tax revenues and reducing welfare benefit payments - and social
welfare because of their effects on crime, attitudes toward minorities and immigrants
and political participation (Moretti 2007).
The broad perception that early school leaving affects in a significant way both society
and individuals, who could benefit from increased educational attainment, has induced pol-
icy makers to design policies that try to address the problem. Reducing early school leaving
to less than 10 percent of the relevant population by 2020 is a headline target in the Europe
2020 strategy and one of the five benchmarks of the strategic framework for European
cooperation in education and training (European Commission 2010). Designing adequate
policies to combat early school leaving is, however, a difficult task that requires the
identification of causal links and the evaluation of the expected costs and benefits. It is
unfortunate that in the European policy debate these requirements are often overlooked or
receive limited attention.
In this paper, we review and discuss the issues surrounding the measurement of the
costs of early school leaving to individuals and societies. We also examine a set of
implemented policies that are expected to affect the percentage of early school leavers by
distinguishing between broad policies – such as changes in minimum school leaving age,
tracking and school resources - and policies explicitly targeted to the sub-population of
early school leavers. While our focus is mainly on Europe, we also consider important
evidence from across the Atlantic.2. The costs of early school leaving
The costs of early school leaving are private, fiscal and social (see Belfield 2008, and
Psacharopoulos 2007). Table 1 from Belfield is a good summary of the expectedTable 1 Benefits from education across different perspectives
P - Private benefits (1) Gain in net earnings and wealth
+ (2) Improved health status/life expectancy
+ (3) Household productivity gains
- (4) Fees for education
F - Fiscal or government (state/local and federal/central) (5) Increased tax payments
+ (6) Lower reliance on government health programs
+ (7) Reduced expenditures on criminal justice
+ (8) Lower reliance on welfare
- (9) Subsidies for education
S – Social Private individual benefits
+ Fiscal benefits
+ (10) Productivity externalities
+ (11) Gains from reduced crime
+ (12) Social value of health
Source: Belfield 2008.
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ings and wealth, improved health and life expectancy and higher lifetime satisfaction.
From these benefits one should subtract the additional private costs, which include
foregone earnings. Fiscal benefits include increased tax payments, lower reliance on
government transfers and reduced expenditures on criminal justice. If the government
subsidizes education, the public costs of additional schooling should be subtracted from
expected benefits. Social benefits include productivity externalities, the social value of
better health and the gains from reduced crime.
Evaluating the costs of early school leaving and the expected benefits of additional educa-
tion – typically high school graduation – is a complex task based on the comparison of
outcomes for a treatment and a control group. It is customary to identify the treatment
group with early school leavers and the control group with high school graduates. Ideally,
individuals in these two groups should differ only in their educational attainment. In prac-
tice, however, they differ also in a number of observable and unobservable characteristics.
While the analyst can control for the former using standard multivariate regression ana-
lysis, less can be done about the latter. To illustrate the implications of failure to control
for unobservables, consider the possibility that high school graduates have better (unob-
served) talent than early school leavers. If labor market outcomes depend both on formal
education and on talent, assigning additional education to the treatment group will not
produce for this group the labor market returns attained by high school graduates. If this is
the case, the average observed difference in earnings between the control and the treat-
ment group over-estimates the expected private benefits of additional education.
2.1. Private costs of early school leaving: earnings and employment
Early school leaving typically reduces lifetime earnings and leads to higher unemployment
incidence and duration. Define as IHS and IESL the (expected) lifetime net earnings associ-
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where F is the annual expected net income flow, i the (real) rate of interest, s the agewhen school ends and labor market entry occurs and T is end of life. The expected in-
come flow is defined as
Fa;t
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where K =HS,ESL, D is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is active and to zero ifshe is retired, u is the unemployment rate, w the net wage, b net welfare benefits, p are
net pension benefits and indices a and t are for age and time respectively, with a = s + t.
We also assume that pensions are a function π of the average wage, and that social
security contributions are used to fund pension outlays.
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1þ ið Þt ð4Þ
The first component on the right hand side of [4] is the discounted sum of the (ex-
pected) difference in earnings (and pensions) over a common length of working and
non-working life; the second component captures the foregone earnings associated to
increasing schooling from ESL to HS; the third and final component captures the
difference in life expectancy between ESL and HS graduates.
The computation of [4] for the average early school leaver requires information on
lifetime earnings profiles, that typically last between 40 and 50 years, and on future
pension benefits. Longitudinal data covering these long life spans are rare outside of
Scandinavia and are often available for specific birth cohorts. They can be used in [4]
with the additional assumption that the earnings profiles do not vary by cohort. In the
absence of long longitudinal data, the empirical literature has used cross sectional data.
For this to make sense, the following assumption is required
Faþx;tþxK ¼ Faþx;tK 1þ πð Þx ð5Þ
This assumption states that the expected income flow accruing to individuals aged a
+ x at time t + x is equal to the income flow accruing to individuals aged a + x at time t,
augmented by average productivity growth π. To illustrate, the earnings flow of an indi-
vidual aged 50 in year 2030 – typically not observable – is equal to the earnings flow of
an individual aged 50 in 2013 – observable in a cross section of individuals of different
ages – inflated by estimated productivity growth.
Suppose that we plot age - earnings profiles by educational attainment using cross
sectional data (see for instance Rouse 2007). The assumption above says that – conditional







In other words, the ratio of the expected income of high school graduates to the
income of early school leavers at time t is equal to the ratio at time t + x.
While this assumption is necessary in practice to estimate lifetime earnings, it is
important to be aware of its limits. Relative wages by education are the outcomes
of the interaction between demand and supply. Consider first demand. There is a
well documented tendency of modern labor markets to become increasingly
polarized, with an expansion of jobs in the upper and lower part of the wage dis-
tribution and a reduction of “middle class” routinized jobs (see Autor et al. 2002,
for the US and Goos et al. 2010, for Europe). Polarization implies that the relative
demand for high school graduates, who have typically filled middle class jobs, is
bound to decline relative to the expanding demand for professionals, who have a
college degree or more, and for the less educated, who fill elementary occupations.
Figures 1 and 2, taken from Goos, Manning and Salomons (2010), illustrate these
patterns for Europe. With increasing polarization and given relative supply, we
Figure 1 Cumulative yearly employment growth of high- and low-paying occupations relative to
middling occupations.
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school leaving – might fall in the future. If this is the case, estimates that rely on
current earnings profiles run the risk of over-estimating the costs of early school
leaving.
Next consider relative supply. Policies that encourage individuals to complete high
school, if successful, will increase the relative supply of high school graduates. Given
demand, this increase will trigger a decline in the relative wage paid to high school
graduates compared to early school leavers. If this is the case, using current wage ratios
to estimate future ratios may lead again to over-estimating the costs of early school
leaving.3
A key ingredient of the first component of equation [4] is that earnings differ by level
of education. This gap should be measured for individuals who differ only in theirFigure 2 European-wide polarization, 1993-2006.
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for an array of observable characteristics that vary across education levels, such as par-
ental background and labor market experience.
An interesting study that evaluates the private and fiscal returns to education in a
number of European countries is De la Fuente and Jimeno (2009), who consider in
their estimates the explicit costs of schooling borne by the representative agent in each
country, her opportunity cost in the form of foregone labor income and lost work ex-
perience, and the expected change in future net-of-tax labor earnings and welfare bene-
fits arising both from higher wages and from higher employment probabilities.
Column (1) in Table 2 reports for each country their estimates of the private returns
to schooling. Schooling turns out to be an attractive investment: for most countries,
the private returns to schooling ranges between 7.5% and 10% and is equal to 8.8% for
the hypothetical average EU country. Column (2) in the table reports instead the esti-
mated recovery rate on educational expenditure, defined as the percentage of the direct
cost of education that is recovered by increased tax revenues and savings on social in-
surance payments. This rate is negative for Sweden, less than 100 percent in Austria,
Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, and above 100 percent
in Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Spain and the UK.
These estimates, however, as well as those provided by many other similar studies,
might suffer from omitted variable bias. In the presence of unobserved differences in
ability, and of measurement error in observed education, standard estimates of the
relationship between earnings and education fail to uncover causal effects. A large
literature has addressed this issue, in an attempt to identify sources of exogenous
variation in educational attainment that could be used to pin down these effects.
There is growing consensus in this literature that a genuine source of exogenous
variation originates from changes in compulsory school reforms or minimum school
leaving laws (see for instance Oreopoulos 2006).4 When these reforms are used as
instruments for education, average estimated returns are typically much higher thanTable 2 Private and fiscal returns to schooling
Country After-tax rate of return to an

















Source: De la Fuente and Jimeno (2009).
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heterogeneity in the returns to schooling, this result is often interpreted as showing
that the individuals affected by these reforms (compliers) have higher returns to school-
ing than those who are not affected.5
In the rest of this section, we review five studies that have tried to estimate the cost
of early school leaving relative to high school or college graduation. For each study, we
briefly discuss the key working assumptions and the main results.
2.1.1 The Rouse study
The study by Rouse 2007, is part of the broader project aimed at evaluating the cost of
early school leaving or of inadequate education in the United States, which was under-
taken by a group of scholars coordinated by Henry Levin of the Teachers College,
Columbia University. Rouse uses CPS (Current Population Survey) data for the years
2003 and 2004 to obtain average age-earnings profiles by education (high school or
more, high school diploma or GED and high school dropouts). She disregards pension
income and makes the following assumptions:
a) the expected income flow accruing to individuals aged a + x at time t + x is equal to
the income flow accruing to individuals aged a + x at time t augmented by average
productivity growth π;
b) annual productivity growth lies between 0 and 2 percent;
c) the discount rate is either 3.5 or 6 percent;
d) the relevant time horizon starts at 18 and lasts about 45 years;
e) no differences in pension income;
f ) no differences in employment rates by education;
g) ordinary least squared estimates of the returns to education, on the ground that
omitted ability bias and measurement error bias more or less cancel out.
Rouse estimates that the per capita lifetime earnings difference between dropouts and
those with a high school diploma ranges from 140,000 to 339,000 dollars (at 2010
prices), depending on the assumed rate of productivity growth and on the discount
rate.
This interesting study has three drawbacks. First, assumption g) is not supported by
recent research using instrumental variables techniques, which consistently finds that
the estimated local average treatment effect is substantially higher than the ordinary
least squares estimate. Second, by considering the age range between 18 and 67, Rouse
downplays the foregone earnings of early school leavers, who may start working well
before age 18. Third, by ignoring differences in employment and unemployment by
education, Rouse under-estimates costs because early school leavers are less likely than
high school graduates to be continuously employed.
2.1.2 The Oreopoulos study
The study by Oreopoulos 2006, shares most of the assumptions made by Rouse, with
the important exception of assumption g). He estimates the causal effect of education
on earnings separately for the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, using
the variation across cohorts and states in minimum school leaving age. He finds that
the earnings gain induced by an additional year of schooling assigned to a dropout who
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and 13.7 percent in the United Kingdom. These returns are substantially higher than
those estimated by standard ordinary least squares techniques.6
Using these estimates, he derives age-earnings profiles from age 15 to age 64. He as-
sumes a 3% discount rate and zero productivity growth and estimates that the average
present value gain from staying an additional year in school is 131,130 dollars (2010 US
dollars) in the United States, 104,521 dollars in Canada and 152,346 dollars in the
United Kingdom. The estimated amount for the United States exceeds foregone earn-
ings by a factor of 13.8.
Since computed gains from an additional year in high school exceed foregone earn-
ings many times over, Oreopoulos asks why individuals drop out from school and offers
several alternative explanations: a) dropouts strongly dislike schools; b) they and their
families are financially constrained; c) students would like to stay on but parents are
not willing to bear the costs, given the uncertainty about future returns; d) investing in
further schooling is too risky; e) students do not act rationally and/or fail to correctly
predict future higher earnings.
2.1.3 The study of school failure in Estonia
Anspal et al. 2011, have carried out a very detailed study of the cost of school failure in
Estonia. This study shares several of the assumptions made by the Rouse study, and
stands out mainly because it removes assumption f), which disregards unemployment
risks. These risks vary both with age and with educational attainment and are much
higher for those who have not completed upper secondary education.
Table 3 presents the main results of this study, separately by gender and by educa-
tional level (tertiary relative to upper secondary, upper secondary relative to lower
secondary). When only those continuously employed are considered, the expected gain
from having an upper secondary degree is estimated at 4 percent for males and at 10
percent for females. However, when the wage gains are corrected for the probability of
employment, the expected gain associated to having an upper secondary education
raises to 35 percent for males and 46 percent for females, a substantial increase. In
terms of lifetime earnings, this corresponds to 40,378 euros (in 2010) for males and to
31,837 euros for females.
The Estonian study clarifies that overlooking the substantial difference in unemploy-
ment risks experienced by individuals with different education can lead to grossly














Relative wage gain for the
continuously employed
30% 4% 35% 10%
Relative wage gain
corrected for the probability
of unemployment
52% 35% 66% 46%
Present value of investment 88,523 dollars 40,378 dollars 64,451 dollars 31,837 dollars
Source: Anspal et al. 2011.
Estonia.
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Working Conditions (EFILWC)
This study examines the economic costs borne by individuals who are not in employment,
education or training (NEET), using a European-wide dataset, the European Survey on In-
come and Living Conditions (EUSILC). This dataset has several advantages and should
be considered as a key resource in any investigation of the costs of early school leaving
in Europe. First, it is based on a common questionnaire and harmonized across more
than 20 European states; second, it includes crucial information for the estimation of
the costs of early school leaving: gross and net earnings, welfare payments – including
unemployment benefits - and labor market status. Third, it covers the period from
2005 to 2011.
Compared to the studies illustrated so far, this study differs also in the empirical
methodology because it replaces the more standard regression analysis with a matching
approach. This is a statistical tool designed to match “treated” individuals (early school
leavers) and “control” individuals (high school graduates) using a large set of observ-
ables. The underlying idea is to find for each early school leaver a high school graduate
with the same set of observable characteristics. Unfortunately, since matching cannot
be done on unobservable characteristics, this method does not allow us to identify a
causal relationship between education and earnings. From this viewpoint, it cannot be
considered as an alternative to the estimates based on credible exogenous variation in
education attainment.
Using the 2008 wave of EUSILC, this study estimates the resource costs of being a
NEET for 26 European countries, the main component of which is earnings. These
costs are obtained by comparing the annual resources available to dropouts to the
resources available to matched individuals, who differ from dropouts only because of
their education and of unobservables. The average estimated costs are equal to 7,184
dollars per year (2010 prices) in the EU26, with a maximum of 15,220 dollars in the
Netherlands and an minimum of 1,267 dollars in Romania. Since NEETs differ from
their matched individuals with higher education not only because of the shorter time
spent in school but also because of unobserved ability, these estimates are likely to be
an upper bound to the true costs if NEETs are on average of lower ability than high
school graduates.
2.1.5 Heterogeneous returns to compulsory education
Most estimates of the cost of early school leaving focus on the cost borne by the average
school leaver, thereby ignoring that early school leavers are heterogeneous, for instance
because they differ in their early life conditions. Brunello et al. 2012a, use comparable
European data from the survey SHARE (Survey on the Health, Age and Retirement in
Europe) and retrospective information to estimate the lifetime earnings of Europeans born
between 1920 and 1956 in nine European countries. Compared to the Rouse study, this
investigation allows for unemployment spells, includes estimated pension income in some
specifications and identifies the causal effects of education on earnings using the cross
country and cross cohort variation in compulsory school years.
Brunello, Weber and Weiss find that an additional year of schooling increases the life-
time earnings of compliers – who typically have less than upper secondary education – by
nine percent. They then estimate the returns to education separately for individuals who
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itional year of schooling increases earnings by 5.2 percent in the former group and by a
very high 21.1 percent in the latter group. The availability of books in the house at age ten
captures important features of the early environment, which contribute to shaping
individual ability.
These estimates suggest that the costs of early school leaving in terms of lifetime
earnings vary substantially among school leavers and could be particularly severe for
those with relatively high individual and parental ability and high marginal costs of
education. They also point out that policies that increase minimum school leaving age
pay off rather handsomely for individuals with good environmental conditions (books
in the house at age ten) but are unlikely to deliver high returns for those forced into
higher education from a less privileged background.
2.2 Fiscal costs of early school leaving: Tax revenues and welfare benefits
In his study of the costs and benefits of early school leaving, Psacharopoulos 2007, classifies
foregone tax revenues as fiscal costs. Since early school leavers earn on average lower life-
time earnings, they also contribute less to society in terms of income taxes. When data on
gross and net earnings are available - as in the EUSILC dataset - foregone tax revenues can
be computed as the difference between lifetime gross and net earnings.
Since early school leavers are more likely to be unemployed or out of the labor force,
they typically receive higher transfers from the government, in the form of unemploy-
ment benefits, disability benefits, and other welfare payments. In its study of NEET, the
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2012),
considers these transfers as public finance costs, defined as the benefits received by
NEETs from public schemes in excess of those received by individuals with at least
upper secondary education. These costs include: unemployment benefits, survivors
benefits, sickness benefits, disability benefits and education-related allowances. When
pension schemes are not fully funded by beneficiaries, one should also include pension
benefits funded by public resources.
Using the matching approach discussed in sub-section 1.1.4, the EFILWC report
estimates the average annual public finance costs of NEETs in the 26 European
countries at 579 dollars per person (2010 prices), with a minimum of 2.34 dollars in
Bulgaria and a maximum of 4,062 dollars in Denmark.7
2.3 Costs of early school leaving: health
Table 1 shows that the effects of additional education on health include private benefits
(improved health status and better life expectancy), fiscal benefits (lower reliance on
government health problems) and social benefits (higher social value of health). There
are many possible channels through which education may improve health, which
include: stress reduction, better decision making and information gathering, higher
likelihood of having health insurance, healthier employment, better neighbourhoods
and peers, and health behaviors, such as smoking, drinking, eating calorie-intensive
food and refraining from exercising (see Lochner 2011).
The relationship between education and health – the “health-education gradient” – is
widely studied. While there is abundant evidence that a gradient exists (Cutler and
Lleras Muney 2010), more controversy exists on whether the gradient reflects a causal
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countries and identifies the effect of education on health using the exogenous variation
generated by mandatory schooling laws. Most of these studies consider self-reported
health and mortality as the key outcome. Some find that education improves health
and reduces mortality - see for instance Mazumder 2008 for the US, Arendt 2005, for
Denmark, Kempter et al. 2011, for German males, Van Kippersluis et al. 2011 for the
Netherlands and Silles 2011, for the UK. Others find small or no effects – see for in-
stance Clark and Royer 2010, and Oreopoulos 2007. Overall, the existing literature is
inconclusive.
In a recent study covering seven European countries (Austria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, England, France, Italy and the Netherlands), Brunello et al. 2013, use the
cross-country and across-cohorts variations in compulsory education to estimate the
causal effect of education on self-reported poor health. Their OLS estimates of the gra-
dient are -2.5 percentage points for females and -1.7 percentage points for males. The
magnitude of the gradient increases sensibly when they use the exogenous variation
provided by compulsory schooling. They find that one additional year of schooling de-
creases the probability of poor health by 4 to 8.5 percentage points for females and by
5 to 6.4 percentage points for males. This study, and several others, suggests that esti-
mating the health costs of low education using non-causal estimates such as ordinary
least squares is likely to grossly under-estimate these costs.
Some of the health benefits associated to higher education accrue to the individual,
and some accrue to society. In modern society, several health costs are borne by gov-
ernments, which are often involved in the supply of health services. By improving
health, better and more education has the potential of reducing public health costs. As
argued by Muenning 2007, however, two countervailing effects may limit the savings at-
tributable to higher education. First, better educated individuals use public health ser-
vices more intensively, for instance because they screen more frequently. Second, they
live longer and therefore are in need of more services later in life. The presence of
these countervailing factors imply that it is difficult to pin down the public health sav-
ings associated to higher education.
Measuring the health costs of early school leaving typically involves two steps. In
the first step, the analyst estimates the effect of additional education on individual
health capital, defined as the utility from the stock of current and future quality-
adjusted life years. In the second step, the savings in (mainly public) health expendi-
tures are measured. In this section, we review two studies that have addressed these
issues.
2.3.1 The study of school failure in Estonia






1þ ið Þt ð7Þ
where V is the monetary value of a year of life, H is the health flow, i is the rate ofinterest, a is age, K is education and E is the expectations operator. In its simplest ver-
sion, the health flow is equal to 1 in the event of life and to 0 in the event of death.
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1þ ið Þt ð8Þ
Each year of life is characterized by different health, with the quality of health declin-
ing with age. Rather than simply adding up – with a discount – future probabilities of
survival, a more encompassing measure of health should weight each year with its qual-
ity. Define this weight as QALY (quality-adjusted life year), an index that ranges from 0
(no quality) to 1 (perfect health). One QALY is a year of life lived in perfect health.
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In their study on Estonia, Anspal et al. 2011, assume that QALY does not vary withage and estimate education specific QALY using the approach suggested by Groot and
van den Brink 2007. In this approach, the authors employ as a measure of quality self-
reported health8, which takes the following values: very good, good, fair, poor, very poor
health, regress it on education and additional covariates, which include parental back-
ground, and use a normalization of the coefficient associated to education to obtain
education specific QALY. As discussed above, their estimates are likely to be lower
bounds, because they do not use exogenous variation to identify the effect of education
on health.
Anspal et al. 2011, estimate that males failing to attain upper secondary education
have a 4.3% lower QALY than males who attain higher education. They combine the in-
formation on QALY with the effects of education on life expectancy – which they
measure at age 25 - use a three percent discount rate and estimate that the difference
in discounted quality-adjusted life years between individuals with upper secondary and
lower secondary education is close to approximately three years for males and to
one year for females. Using as value of a life year approximately 45,072 dollars in 2010
prices, they estimate the value of health capital by gender and education for Estonia.
Results are reported in Table 4.Table 4 Differences in health capital by education level
Males Females
Lower secondary minus basic education 105,950 58,153
Upper minus lower secondary education 69,776 37,503
College minus upper secondary education 77,244 45,071
Source: Anspal et al. 2011.
Per head. Estonia. Dollars. 2010 prices.
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of early school leaving in terms of lower health capital are higher than the costs
in terms of lower lifetime earnings. We also notice that the estimates in Table 4
do not include the higher public health expenditures associated with a lower
health capital.
2.3.2 The study by Muennig
The study on Estonia produces estimates of health capital by education but is silent
about the effects of education on public health expenditures. An antecedent study by
Muenning 2007, uses US data to estimate both the private and the public health costs
associated with less than upper secondary education. As in the Estonian study, the esti-
mate of the private costs relies on two basic ingredients, the effects of education on life
expectancy (the number of years an individual is expected to live at a given age) and
the effects on quality-adjusted life years, or QALY. Muennig estimates that attaining a
high school degree increases perfect health over the lifetime by 1.7 years. Valuing one
additional year of perfect health at 122,767 dollars (at constant 2010 prices), he
estimates the benefits of high school graduation at approximately 204,241 dollars.
Since high school graduates in the US are less likely to be enrolled in public health
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, a reduction in the share of early school
leavers translates into large differences in annual public costs. While the average school
dropout consumes 3,013 dollars (at 2010 prices) in public health insurance costs per
year, the average high school graduate consumes 1,116 dollars. Muenning (2007) esti-
mates that each new high school graduate can save the government approximately
43,527 dollars in health care over her lifetime.2.4 Fiscal and social costs of early school leaving: crime
Belfield 2008, classifies the effects of education on crime into fiscal benefits – reduced
expenditures on criminal justice – and social benefits – the gains to society from
reduced crime. There are several reasons why education may have an effect on crime.
Machin et al. 2011, consider the following three channels: income effects, time avail-
ability, and patience or risk aversion. On the one hand, education increases the returns
to legitimate work, raising the opportunity costs of illegal behavior. On the other hand,
punishment for criminal offences may lead to imprisonment. By raising wage rates,
schooling makes any time spent out of the labor market more costly. These arguments
suggest that those who can earn more are less likely to engage in crime. But it is also
possible that schooling raises the returns to crime. For example, certain white collar
crimes require higher levels of education (see Moretti 2007).
Time spent in education reduces the time available for participating in criminal activity.
Whilst youngsters are at school, they stay off the streets. Education may also influence
crime by affecting patience and risk aversion (see Lochner and Moretti 2004). More
patient or more risk averse individuals are likely to place a greater weight on the possibil-
ity of future punishment and future income losses from imprisonment. In a similar vein,
additional schooling may affect the taste for crime by increasing the psychological costs of
breaking the law.
As in the case of earnings and health, the fact that education and crime are
negatively correlated does not automatically guarantee that education has a causal
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2004, for the US, and Machin et al. 2011, for the UK, use the exogenous vari-
ation provided by changes in compulsory school laws, which affect different co-
horts of individuals going through their schooling experience. Lochner and
Moretti found that US states that raised high school graduation rates by increas-
ing minimum school leaving age experienced significant declines in incarceration
rates. Machin and co-authors found that the exogenous increase in education in-
duced by the 1947 school reform in the UK produced a significant reduction in
property crimes.
Using the estimates by Lochner and Moretti 2004, Moretti 2007, computes the ex-
pected social benefits from reduced crime associated to a one percent increase in
high school graduation rates. He multiplies the estimated total cost per crime –
which consists of incarceration costs, property losses and victim costs – by the esti-
mated reduction in the arrest and crime rate associated to higher education.
Admittedly, this estimate is a lower bound to the cost of crime because it ignores im-
portant cost components, which include law enforcement and judicial costs, private
security measures and the steps people take to avoid being victimized. Even so, ex-
pected savings are estimated at 2.21 billion dollars (2010 prices), a substantial
amount. The positive externality in crime reduction induced by an extra male high
school graduate is between 14 and 26 percent of the private return to high school
graduation.
Machin and co-authors 2011, estimate the social benefits from crime reduction
that would follow from a one percent reduction in the percentage of individuals
with no educational qualifications. They find that the estimated crime reduction
ranges between 43,921 and 88,469 offences and that the associated costs range
from 100 to 202 million dollars (2010 prices). Assuming that an extra year of
school at age 16 is sufficient to obtaining an educational qualification, they also es-
timate that the cost of achieving a one percent reduction in the pool of individuals
without qualification is 40 million dollars (2010 prices), way below the expected
social benefits from crime reduction.2.5 Evaluating the general equilibrium effects of changes in the share of early school
leavers
Policies that aim at reducing the share of early school leavers need to compare
expected benefits and costs. Since relative earnings are affected by changes in
relative supply and demand, a potential difficulty with the estimate of expected
benefits is that these benefits may vary when the percentage of early school
leavers is altered. Policies can affect not only wages by education but also the
shape of age-earning profiles, a crucial ingredient in the computation of expected
lifetime gains.
The availability of estimates that link changes in relative supply with changes in rela-
tive wages may allow the analyst to correct estimated benefits by adjusting wages by
age and education. To illustrate, consider a setup where employers hire four different
types of labor, the young with less than secondary education, Ny
ESL, the old with the
same education, No
ESL, the young and the old with upper secondary education or more,
Brunello and De Paola IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 15 of 312014, 3:22
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/22Ny
HS and No
HS. These four groups are imperfect substitutes in the production of goods
and services. Employers hire workers to maximize profits
π ¼ f Nð Þ−WyESLNyESL−WyHSNyHS−WoESLNoESL−WyHSNyHS ð11Þ
subject to the following technology
N ¼ eθ1Nyσ þ eθ2N0σ
 1
σ ð12Þ
Ny ¼ eμ1 NyESL
 ρ1 þ eμ2 NyHS ρ1h i 1ρ1
No ¼ eμ3 NoESL
 ρ2 þ eμ4 NoHS ρ2h i 1ρ2 ð13Þ
where W is for wages and product prices are normalized to 1, ρ1, ρ2 and σ are elasti-cities of substitution (with values between 0 and 1) and θ1, θ2 and μi are relative effi-









and suggests that a reduction in the relative share of early school leavers increases

















A reduction in the share of early school leavers over youth employment reduces their
wage relative to that of older early school leavers.
Following Katz and Murphy 1992, equations [14] and [15] can be estimated using re-
peated cross sections from the EUSILC dataset. These estimates can then be used to ad-
just wages by age and education and the estimate of the monetary costs of early school
leaving.
2.6 Estimating the cost of early school leaving in Europe. Guidelines for empirical studies
The review of the existing empirical literature on the costs of early school leaving sug-
gests the following guidelines for an empirical study:
1. identify the causal effect of education on earnings and health, using credible exogenous
variation. A source of exogenous variation that has become increasingly popular in the
empirical literature is provided by compulsory school leaving reforms, which have
occurred in Europe since the end of the Second World War. A summary of some of
these reforms is provided by Garrouste 2011. It is not clear whether this approach can
be applied in all the 27 European countries. To be useful for the purpose at hand, a
compulsory school reform should affect years of compulsory education for a subset of
treated cohorts and be ineffective for a subset of other cohorts;
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to education. Empirical research should go beyond estimating the average return to
additional education, and should consider how these returns vary at different points of
the distribution of early school leavers;
3. pool data from different cross sections and estimate age earnings profiles net of
business cycle effects (pre-2008 and post-2008);
4. evaluate general equilibrium effects. If the proposed change in the share of early school
leavers is small, because of proximity to the European benchmark of 10 percent, these
effects can probably be disregarded. If instead the change is large, as one would foresee
for countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy or Romania, adjust age earnings profiles to
take into account the effects of changes of quantities on relative prices;
5. include the risk of unemployment as a key ingredient of the cost of early school
leaving. Differences in the probability of employment may be more serious than
differences in earnings.3. The effectiveness of policies combating early school leaving
Early school leaving is the result of multiple factors, such as poor early school experi-
ence, lack of ability, low perceived labor market returns to education, heavy discounting
of future benefits, poor social environment and peer influence. Consequently, interven-
tions aimed at reducing this phenomenon have to address a number of different as-
pects. Since handling all these factors together is particularly difficult, many existing
policies tend to focus only on some.
Several policies have been pursued by different countries to reduce early school leav-
ing (see European Commission 2010), and the debate on which policies are more ef-
fective is still very animated among both academics and politicians. While some
policies are aimed at students at-risk or are targeted to disadvantaged pupils, other pol-
icies affect the entire school system with actions involving all pupils in school.9 Unfor-
tunately, policies in this area are rarely evaluated using approaches that identify causal
effects, partly because the design and implementation of many programs disregard that
a source of exogenous variation in the treatment should be available.
As reported by Meierkord and Mascherini 2012, many policies implemented in EU
countries do not even define outcome targets. Typically, the outcome target refers to
the percentage of participants who are expected to achieve a qualification. Very rare
are also evaluations that quantify the benefits obtained by individuals who have
achieved the target qualification, relative to those accruing when the target is not
reached. On top of this, we often do not know whether these benefits outweigh the
program costs. Completely absent are studies that include in the cost-benefit analysis
the gains in terms of fiscal benefits and externalities. Unfortunately, the virtual absence
of careful studies providing guidance to policy-makers can lead to an inefficient alloca-
tion of (scarce) public resources.
In this section, we review a number of evaluation studies that rely on credible identi-
fication strategies. While some of these studies only consider the impact of the policy
under study on selected outcome variables, there are also studies that offer a cost-
benefit analysis. We consider both interventions affecting the entire school system and
interventions targeted at disadvantaged groups.
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In this section we review: a) policies that increase the number of compulsory years of
schooling; b) policies that change the time of tracking; and c) policies that affect the
organization of teaching activities, both by changing the number of pupils per class and
by changing curricula.
3.1.1 Changes in the length of compulsory education
Compulsory school laws establish either a minimum number of years of education that
an individual should complete before leaving school or a minimum school leaving age.
These laws are widespread in Europe (see Murtin and Viarengo 2011). In several Euro-
pean countries, compulsory education has repeatedly increased after the end of the Sec-
ond World War from primary and lower secondary education to include at least part if
not the entire cycle of upper secondary education.
Higher compulsory education addresses the dropout problem because it forces poten-
tial school leavers to stay in school longer and eventually complete upper secondary
education (and even college). Several studies have estimated the effect of adding one
year of compulsory education on average educational attainment for European coun-
tries. Brunello et al. 2009, review some of these studies for Continental (Western) Eur-
ope and show that the estimated average effect is close to 0.3 years of schooling. For
the UK, Oreopoulos 2006, estimates that the compulsory increase in the school leaving
age - from 14 to 15 - in 1947 increased the average school leaving age by more than
half a year.
In a recent empirical study, Cabus and De Witte 2011, estimates the causal impact of
one additional year of compulsory education on the dropout rate using administrative
data for students living in Amsterdam (for whom the information on the date of birth
is available). The authors identify a treatment and a control group depending on year
of birth. While before the reform pupils were mandated to attend school until their
17th birthday, after the reform mandatory school attendance increased to age 18 (or
until a higher secondary diploma was obtained if that comes at an early age). They esti-
mate the effect of a one year increase in compulsory education by comparing the aver-
age dropout rate in the treatment and control groups, after conditioning for age and
time effects, and find that the policy has reduced the rate in the former group relative
to the latter by 2.28 to 2.52 percentage points, with the largest effect for vocational stu-
dents (−3.32 percentage points) and Dutch natives (−6.12 percentage points), and no
effect for students who have experienced grade retention. The estimated effect, how-
ever, is driven mainly by an increase in the dropout rate of students in the control
group, probably due to the anticipated improvement in the Dutch labor market when
the policy was implemented.
As argued by Oreopoulos 2006, compulsory education can be either not binding –
for those individuals who are already investing in higher education – or binding for
those who would have attained less education in the absence of the law. If we believe in
the investment model of education, which predicts that each individual chooses her op-
timal level of investment by equating perceived marginal benefits to marginal costs,
and if we are prepared to assume that there are no obstacles to individual choice, then
compulsory school reforms cannot be optimal because they force some individuals to
invest more than their private optimum, at a level where marginal costs are above
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the presence of positive externalities – for instance because education reduces crime –
or because individuals are constrained by lack of financial resources or finally because
they are not able to predict in a satisfactory way the expected returns to further invest-
ment, it is not clear that these changes are the most efficient way to address the drop-
out problem.
Importantly, the effects of compulsory school reforms on the sub-sample of com-
pliers are far from homogeneous. As discussed above, Brunello et al. 2012b, have shown
that the expected payoff in terms of higher lifetime earnings of adding one year of com-
pulsory education varies substantially with the conditions that individuals face early in
life. Their findings suggest that among the individuals induced by these reforms to at-
tain higher education, only those with enough books at home have been able to reap
significant private economic returns. A significant group of individuals, who lived in
rural areas with very few books at home, attained higher education but earned much
lower private returns.
3.1.2 School tracking
An important issue in the organization of secondary educational systems is whether
and at what age students should be allocated to academic and vocational tracks. As re-
ported by Brunello and Checchi 2007, countries differ in the age at which students are
tracked into different types (or levels) of education. While in the US and Scandinavia
secondary schools are broadly comprehensive, in Austria and Germany pupils are
tracked into different types of schools as early as at age 10. Many European countries
fall between these two extremes. There is also variety across countries in the number of
available tracks.
Early tracking may affect early school leaving for two reasons. On the one hand, by
affecting test scores they may induce some students to drop out from school too soon.
On the other hand, by providing a more flexible set of curricula and a vocational track
that places less emphasis on academic abilities, early tracking may be able to keep lon-
ger in schools those students who prefer practical trades to more academic education.
Some studies have tried to evaluate the effects of tracking on educational outcomes.
Hanushek and Wössmann 2006, for instance, use a difference-in-differences approach
to compare the mean and the dispersion of test scores before and after tracking in two
samples of countries: a treatment sample with early tracking (before age 15) and a con-
trol sample where tracking occurs after age 15 if ever. They find that early tracking in-
creases inequality in test score performance but has limited effects on average
achievement. However, as shown by Jakubowski 2010, their results might be affected by
the fact that the international tests they consider are taken at different ages.10
Pekkarinen et al. 2009, examine the gradual introduction of a comprehensive school
system in Finland and find that the reform has a small positive effect on verbal test
scores but no effect on mean performance in arithmetic or logical reasoning tests. In
addition, the reform improved the test scores of students with poorly educated parents.
This evidence is in contrast with that produced by Figlio and Page 2002, who find that
tracking in the US does not harm low-ability students.
In a recent study, Hall 2012 evaluates the effects of introducing a more comprehen-
sive school system on dropout rates in Sweden. She considers a pilot scheme
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at increasing the academic content and the duration of vocational curricula, thereby re-
ducing the differences with the more academic tracks. In Sweden, the municipalities in-
volved in the pilot scheme were decided by a central authority on the basis of
observable characteristics. Hall identifies the effects of the policy on the treated munici-
palities by exploiting the exogenous variation provided by a set of municipality charac-
teristics. Her estimates show that the probability that upper secondary school students
drop out increased by 3.8 percentage points with the piloted policy, mainly as a result
of the behavior of low performing students. Since the piloted policy also increased
workplace training, these negative effects may have been partly compensated by higher
employment rates among students leaving school early.
3.1.3. Changing educational inputs: class size
The effects on student performance of the resources devoted to education are a central
concern in the economic and political debate on educational policies. Starting with the
controversial Coleman Report, a study commissioned by the United States Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare in the mid-sixties to assess the availability of equal
educational opportunities, many empirical studies have investigated the effects of class
size, teaching experience and ability, peer characteristics and school resources on stu-
dent achievement. However, the results obtained are far from conclusive.
The main findings of the Coleman Report, showing that inputs into schooling have
negligible effects on student achievement, were confirmed by Hanushek’s 1986 influen-
tial survey of the economic research on the subject. A key ingredient of the educational
production function is class size. Hanushek concludes that there does not appear to be
a strong, systematic relationship between school resources, and in particular class size,
and student achievement. Krueger 2003, on the other hand, documents a positive asso-
ciation between resources, class size and achievement.
In traditional studies, the estimates of class size effects are plagued by serious identi-
fication problems, which produce biased estimates. When trying to assess the effect of
an intervention such as a reduction in class size on student achievement, researchers
are typically not able to observe all the other confounding factors that enter into the
student learning process, including student effort, family support or teaching quality.
The problem is that these omitted inputs are likely to correlate both with the interven-
tion itself and with the selected outcome. For instance, parents may choose schools
with smaller class size for their offspring and invest more of their personal time in their
children’s education. The effect of this joint choice is to create an upward bias in the
estimated effect of class size. Conversely, if they invest less time, a downward bias is
generated. A downward bias would also emerge if school administrators assigned pupils
from a disadvantaged background or with learning difficulties to smaller classes or if
better teachers were assigned to larger classes.
To handle these problems, recent empirical research investigating class size effects
has relied on identification strategies that exploit exogenous variations in class size in-
duced by controlled or natural experiments. On the one hand, Krueger 1999, and Krue-
ger and Whitmore 2001, have focused on the Tennessee STAR project,11 where pupils
are randomly allocated to classes of different size. On the other hand, Angrist and Lavy
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variation provided by administrative rules which impose maximum class size limits.12
The focus of these researches is mainly the effect of class size on test scores, which
indirectly affect the decision to stay in school. More recently, a few studies have looked
explicitly at the effects of class size on educational attainment. Fredriksson et al. 2013,
using very rich data from Sweden and the exogenous variation in class size induced by
a maximum class size rule, show that reducing class size by one pupil during the final
three years of primary school increases years of schooling by only 0.05 years (or two-
thirds of a month). They report that smaller classes increase the probability of having a
college degree by 0.8 percentage points, improve cognitive test scores and increase
earnings at age 27 to 42. Using these effects, the authors carry out a costs-benefits ana-
lysis, showing that for reasonable values of the discount rate the present discounted
value of benefits associated to the policy exceeds the present discounted value of costs.
They also estimate an internal rate of return (the discount rate that equalizes the
present values of costs and benefits) equal to 17.8 percent.
Similar studies are provided by Browning and Heinesen 2007, and Bingley et al. 2005,
who investigate the effects of class size in Denmark. As in Fredriksson et al. 2013, the
Browning and Heinesen 2007 study relies on the exogenous variation provided by a
maximum class size rule. They find that reducing class size in the 8th grade by one
pupil (a 5% decline) increases educational attainment by 0.02 years on average and the
probability of completing upper secondary education by 0.4%, a small effect.
Unfortunately, this study does not include a cost-benefit analysis. This type of inves-
tigation is instead carried out by Bingley et al. 2005, who examine the effects of
changes in class size in Denmark using a different estimation strategy that combines
administrative rules with between-siblings differences. The advantage of this method
is that it does not rely on the identifying assumption that class size is not influenced
by parents. Using data on the whole Danish population, they find that class size has a
statistically significant but very small effect on educational attainment. In particular,
they estimate that reducing class size in the 8th grade by 5% increases mean schooling
attainment by about 0.005 years, a tiny effect. Effects are somewhat higher for house-
holds with three or four children and much larger when focusing on large
municipalities.
Using wage returns estimated with twin data, the authors compute the ratio of dis-
counted benefits to costs associated to a 5% reduction in class size. As shown in Table 5
below, which is based on a five percent rate of return to education, this ratio is very
low and outweighs the costs only for a zero discount rate and for males.Table 5 Discounted present value of benefits to costs associated to reducing class size
by 5%
Ratio of discounted benefits
to costs
Ratio of discounted benefits
to costs
Ratio of discounted benefits
to costs
Discount rate annual productivity growth 0% annual productivity growth 1% annual productivity growth 2%
Males Females Males Females Males Females
0% 1.07 0.32 1.08 0.33 1.09 0.33
2% 0.58 0.19 0.58 0.19 0.59 0.20
3% 0.34 0.12 0.34 0.12 0.34 0.12
Source: Bingley et al. 2005.
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pils are randomly assigned to classes of different size, and show that being assigned to
a smaller class size produces beneficial effects on educational attendance, as randomly
selected students are 1.8 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college at age
20 than students assigned to larger classes.13 In contrast to Bingley, Jensen and Walker,
their cost-benefit analysis suggests that the expected benefits from reducing class size
outweigh the costs.14
It is worthwhile to notice that both Bingley et al. 2005 and Chetty et al. 2011, do not
estimate the effect of class size on wages. The estimates by Bingley, Jensen and Walker
are based on the assumption that class size affects wages by changing years of school-
ing. Chetty et al., on the other hand, assume that class size modifies wages because it
changes test scores. Fredriksson et al. 2013, instead, provide an estimation of the effect
of class size directly on wages. They also show, using their data, that indirect methods
tend to underestimate the true effect.15
In sum, the reviewed studies agree on the fact that reducing class size may have a
positive albeit relatively small effect on educational attainment. Less agreement exists
on the estimated costs and benefits of a policy that reduces class size early on, with
some studies finding that benefits are much lower than the costs and other studies
finding the opposite.
3.1.4. The content and structure of teaching
Early school leaving is often correlated to bad school performance. As a consequence,
programs that try to improve student performance can also induce individuals to stay
in education longer. It is well known that one key factor in determining student per-
formance and attainment is teacher quality.16 In the late 1990s, two programs were in-
troduced in England with the aim of improving the teaching of literacy and numeracy
in primary schools. At the beginning, these programs were implemented only in a few
cities but were subsequently extended nationally as the ‘National Literacy Strategy’ and
the ‘National Numeracy Strategy’ (in 1998 and 1999 respectively).
These programs tried to improve the quality of teaching by providing more focused
instruction and a more effective classroom management. For instance, a daily literacy
hour was introduced and divided into 10-15 minutes of reading or writing for the en-
tire class, 10-15 minutes of whole-class session on word work (phonics, spelling and
vocabulary) and sentence work (grammar and punctuation), 25-30 minutes of directed
group activities (on aspects of writing or reading), and a plenary session at the end to
revisit the objectives of the lesson.
Machin et al. 2004 evaluate the effects of the ‘literacy hour’ relying on a
difference-in-differences strategy. Since the implementation of the policy was pre-
ceded by pilot projects, they could compare educational attainment at the end of
primary school in ‘treatment schools’ and in schools in an appropriately defined
comparison group, before and after the ‘pilot’ project was introduced. Results show
that the literacy hour has produced a 2-3 percentage point improvement in the
reading and English skills of primary school children involved in the program. The
authors estimate the costs per pupil of the program at £25.52 per annum, and the
present discounted value of benefits in the range of £1,918-£4,995, suggesting that
the policy had a very high payoff.
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Students at risk of dropping out display easily identifiable characteristics, including
among others low income, scarcely educated parents, and low attendance rates. Policies
that try to change individual choices of subjects at risk are targeted either directly at
pupils or at schools. In this section, we review some of the policies that were recently
implemented in European countries.
3.2.1. Conditional cash transfers: the EMA project in UK
The use of conditional cash transfers to improve student performance is becoming a
common practice in the educational systems of several countries. For example, in
Colombia, the FA (Familias en Acciòn) and PACES (Programa de Ampliaciòn de
Cobertura de Educaciòn Secundaria) programs assigned vouchers, respectively, to pri-
mary and secondary school students to encourage attendance and performance
(Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, and Kremer 2002). In Mexico, the PROGRESA finan-
cial incentive scheme offered cash payments to families to increase school enrolment
and attendance (Schultz 2004). In Kenya, the Girls’ Scholarship Programme provided
awards to female students who obtained high test scores (Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton
2009). Similar programs have also been recently implemented in a number of devel-
oped countries. In the United States, following the “Helping Outstanding Pupils
Educationally” (HOPE) program implemented in Georgia, several other states have
introduced analogous scholarship programs. About 27,000 students benefitted from
the financial incentives offered by a number of schools in Chicago, Dallas and New
York (Fryer 2011). As far as European Countries are concerned Leuven et al. 2010
and De Paola et al. 2012 study the effect of financial incentive respectively in the
Netherlands and in Italy reaching mixed results.
Since many of these programs have been implemented following an experimental de-
sign (students were randomly assigned to a treatment and a control group), their effects
have been evaluated rather extensively. It emerges that conditional cash transfers work
well in increasing attendance and enrolment, especially in developing countries
(Angrist et al. 2006).
Among the programs implemented in European countries, particularly relevant is the
Earnings Maintenance Allowance (EMA). This project was piloted in England in 1999
before national implementation. The effects of the program have been evaluated by
Dearden et al. 2009, using data from the first cohort of the EMA pilot study.17 The tar-
get population consisted of pupils who had completed their last year of compulsory
education (Year 11) in 1999. The program intended to change the opportunity cost of
education by paying a means tested benefit to 16 to 18-year-olds from low income fam-
ilies who remained in full-time education after compulsory education. The benefit
could be claimed for up to two years (or three for young people with special educa-
tional needs) and could be used to attend any form of full-time post-16 educational
program. Additional bonuses were paid for regular attendance (at the end of a term of
regular attendance, the student would receive £50 or £80) and for successful comple-
tion of examinations. By inducing students to stay on until completion of upper sec-
ondary education, this policy could directly affect dropout rates.
The identification strategy used by Dearden and co-authors to evaluate this policy is
based on matching techniques that match each individual in the treatment sample with
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tics. The outcome variables considered are: full-time education, inactivity and work.
The authors find that EMA has had a positive and significant effect on post-
compulsory education, with a 6.7 percentage points increase in the percentage of indi-
viduals from income-eligible families completing two years of post-compulsory educa-
tion (from 54.3 percent before the treatment to 61.0 percent after the treatment). Both
inactivity and employment rates also declined by three and 1.5 percentage points
respectively.18
The cost-benefit analysis conducted in this study suggests that the program benefits
would outweigh the costs if students staying two additional years in school – and there-
fore completing upper secondary education - experienced a real increase in future earn-
ings higher than 6.2 to 7.7 percent. These values are below the returns to education
estimated by Oreopoulos 2006 for the UK - 11 percent for males and 18 percent for fe-
males - but above those estimated by Devereux and Hart 2010.
3.2.2. Additional resources to schools with disadvantaged children
In this section we report the results of three evaluation studies that consider programs
implemented in France, the Netherlands and the UK. All these programs devoted add-
itional resources to schools with disadvantaged pupils.The Education Priority Zones program in France The Education Priority Zones
program (ZEP), first established in France in 1982, was targeted at both primary and
junior-high schools located in disadvantaged zones.19 As the main policy in France di-
rected at helping students from a disadvantaged background, its main objective was to
reduce the number of students who dropped out of the school system without any de-
gree. Schools included in the program received additional resources, which were mainly
used for additional hours of instruction and to pay bonuses to teachers and other
personnel.
Bénabou et al. 2009 use a sample of 24,455 students who entered 6th grade in 1989
and information on school and teacher characteristics to evaluate the effects of this pol-
icy on the probability that targeted students move up either to the 8th or to the 10th
grade of the academic track rather than switching to a vocational track after the 7th or
the 9th grade, and on the likelihood of success at the “Baccalauréat” (the French
national exam at the end of high school). These effects are estimated using a
difference-in-differences approach, which compares students in the same grade but of
different cohorts, some who attended school before the program was implemented and
others attending school after priority status was granted.
The results are somewhat disappointing in that the impact of ZEP on the academic
achievement of students in targeted schools was never significantly different from zero,
after conditioning for pre-existing differences between treated and control schools. One
reason why the policy was not successful was that it was not well focused. Furthermore,
the bonuses awarded to teachers were not a sufficient incentive to attract experienced
or highly qualified teachers.Devoting additional resources to schools with disadvantaged students in
the Netherlands Devoting additional resources to schools with disadvantaged students
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gression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to evaluate two subsidies implemented in the
Netherlands, which gave additional funds to schools with a share of disadvantaged pu-
pils above 70 percent. While one subsidy provided extra resources to improve the
working conditions of teachers, the other subsidy offered additional funding for the
purchase of computers and software. By comparing schools with shares of disadvan-
taged students around a threshold value, the authors find that the policy has failed to
increase student performance in nationwide tests and had led to lower attainment.
These negative results could depend on the fact that the extra payment to teachers was
not conditional on performance. The negative effect of additional computer resources
might have occurred because instruction methods that use computers intensively are
less effective than more traditional methods. These negative findings cannot be easily
generalized to other contexts. The fact that these interventions focusing on schools
with a large share of disadvantaged students did not succeed in increasing test scores
does not imply that these policies would be ineffective if implemented in other schools.Excellence in Cities (EiC) in the UK Excellence in Cities (EiC) was introduced in
England in September 1999 to encourage participation in higher education. Schools in
disadvantaged areas of England were given extra resources to try to improve standards.
The original program was expanded over time and now covers about one-third of all
secondary (state) schools. The main features of the EiC programme were: the employ-
ment of ‘learning mentors’ to help students overcome educational or behavioral prob-
lems; the provision of ‘learning support units’ to provide short-time teaching and
support programs for difficult pupils; a ‘gifted and talented programme’ to provide extra
support for 5-10 percent of pupils in each school.
Machin and McNally 2012 evaluate the impact of the Excellence in Cities policy in
secondary schools by assessing the extent to which the whole range of activities imple-
mented by the program have led to an improvement in both learning and school at-
tendance at age 14. The analysis is based on national-level administrative records of
pupil attainment and attendance before (1999) and after the policy was introduced
(from 2000 to 2003). The identification strategy is based on a difference-in-differences
approach and consists of comparing outcomes in schools where the EiC policy has
been in place with outcomes in schools belonging to an appropriate comparison group.
This strategy exploits the fact that the policy does not cover every disadvantaged or
poorly performing school in England.
The authors find that EiC has contributed both to better learning, in term of higher
scores in Mathematics (although not in English) and to higher pupil attendance.20 The
cost-benefit analysis suggests that the expected benefits of EiC are about 0.02 years of
schooling and about £400 over the lifetime (assuming a rate of return to a year of edu-
cation of eight percent and linear wage profiles). These expected benefits are close to
the costs of the policy.21Parent involvement and the decision to drop out: evidence from France
Goux et al. 2013 evaluate a program implemented in 2010-2011 in 37 schools in Paris,
involving 4,300 students in 181 classes. The intervention was randomized at the class
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of the secondary schools involved in the program were required to identify students at
risk of dropping out and to help their families form less unrealistic aspirations and
make better school choices by providing adequate information. Two meetings were
held between the principal and the selected families with the purpose of illustrating the
complexity of the choices available in the French educational system. These meetings
had also the purpose of identifying the specific aspirations of families, evaluate whether
these were realistic, provide information on alternative options, and explain the merits
of vocational education.
The authors find that, as a result of the mentoring program, involved parents became less
confident that their children would be able to graduate from high school. Enrolment in vo-
cational tracks increased and both dropout rates and grade repetition fell by one third, a
large effect. This effect persisted two years after the treatment as differences between treated
and control students further increased rather than diminish as time went by. Although the
authors do not provide a cost-benefit analysis, the costs of the program appear to have been
small compared to the large effects produced by the policy on early school leaving.3.3 Critical assessment
This review of the studies evaluating policies that address directly or indirectly early school
leaving in Europe leads to at least three considerations. First of all, the number of studies is
limited. As demonstrated by the increasing number of evaluation studies focusing on pro-
grams implemented in other countries, such as the US and Canada, this is not due to a lack
of interest in the subject. Second, serious evaluation is possible only when the policy is de-
signed in a way that causal effects – from the policy to the outcomes - can be identified.
Currently available evaluation methods rely on the definition of treatment and control
groups independently of the outcome of interest. In some cases, these groups are obtained
by explicit randomization. In other cases, the evaluation uses the variations in the expos-
ition to a certain policy that originate from an exogenous source that is not correlated to
the outcome of interest (instrumental variables or natural experiment approach). Another
recent technique, in the spirit of natural experiments, is the so-called regression discon-
tinuity approach, which can be applied when the assignment to treatment is based on a
specific exogenous threshold.
When public funds are allocated to policies, it is paramount to consider that rigorous policy
evaluation is possible only under particular circumstances. Policies need then to be designed
so as to allow sources of exogenous variation in the treatment, a necessary requirement for
the identification of casual effects.22 Only in this case it is possible to obtain reliable estimates
of the policy impact, a crucial starting point for any serious cost-benefit analysis.
Third, evaluation requires accurate data. It is not surprising that most of the studies that
we have reviewed in this report come from countries with a tradition of collecting and re-
leasing to academic researchers rich individual data. Education affects individual, social and
fiscal outcomes, ranging from labor market performance to health, lifelong learning partici-
pation, job and life satisfaction, crime, social cohesion, growth, tax revenues and benefits
payments. A fully-fledged policy evaluation would require data on all these aspects. When
such data exist, it is potentially possible to measure the impact of different policies on each
of these outcomes and try to assess which policy has produced the best overall impact.
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policy intervention occur after several years, information should be collected on the life
histories of treated and control groups. While this type of data is available in some North
European countries, they are not available in most EU member states. In many situations,
only a few outcomes are observable. In these cases, evaluations are less reliable because pol-
icies may produce effects on variables that are important but not observed by the analyst.
As shown in our review of evaluation studies, cost-benefit analysis of European programs
typically focus on wage returns and tend to fail to calculate the overall benefit-cost ratio.
The computation of these ratios with the information at hand often requires strong as-
sumptions. For instance, Levin et al. 2012, in their evaluation of US policies targeted at re-
ducing early school leaving, rely on the very strong assumption that social benefits are a
given percentage of observed private benefits.4. Conclusions
Economic policies addressing early school leaving can be justified with equity and/or efficient
arguments (see Moretti 2006). If equity is interpreted in terms of equal access to income,
then public policies aimed at reducing early school leaving can be viewed as a form of in-
kind transfer constraining beneficiaries to spend the transfer on education instead of leaving
them free to spend it on their preferred goods. Apart from equity arguments, government
interventions aimed at reducing early school leaving can be justified by efficiency consider-
ations. Inefficient school leaving decisions can be due to credit constraints, uninformed or
irrational individual decisions or to the fact that the social returns exceed the private returns
to schooling (education not only rewards the educated individual, but creates externalities).
In this paper, we have focused on the efficiency argument and reviewed the issues sur-
rounding the measurement of the costs of early school leaving to individuals and societies.
And we examined several policies that were implemented in Europe to reduce early school
leavers. These policies include broad policies – such as changes in minimum school leaving
age, tracking and school resources – as well as more targeted policies. While our focus is
mainly on Europe, we also consider important evidence from across the Atlantic.
Our assessment of the empirical literature that tries to measure the costs of early
school leaving can be summarized in the following guidelines for an empirical study:
1. the causal effect of education on earnings and health should be identified, using
credible exogenous variation;
2. it should be recognized that early school leavers are heterogeneous and have
heterogeneous returns to education. Therefore, empirical research should go
beyond estimating the average return to additional education and should consider
how these returns vary at different points of the distribution of early school leavers;
3. in the absence of long longitudinal data, cross section data can be used only at the
price of strong assumptions that have important implications on outcomes;
4. general equilibrium effects should be evaluated, especially if the proposed change in
the share of early school leavers is large;
5. unemployment and health are key ingredients in the cost of early school leaving. In
particular, differences in the probability of employment may be more serious than
differences in earnings.
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relevant spillovers that affect economic growth. In addition, education also reduces the
probability that an individual engages in socially costly activities, such as crime. Given
their large social costs, the social returns to education can be very high even when it
generates small reductions in these activities. Education also improves health and civic
participation, which increases social returns. Even if there is still no consensus on the
exact magnitude of these effects, existing studies suggest that the social returns to edu-
cation might be higher than the private returns.
In the second part of the paper, we have looked at the policies implemented by EU
member states to reduce early school leaving. We have highlighted that comparing dif-
ferent policies – some addressing all students and some others targeted at disadvan-
taged students – on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis is a very difficult task. Success
in this exercise requires not only accurate data on outcomes and costs, but also that
the same outcomes are considered, that individuals with similar characteristics are tar-
geted and that similar evaluation methods are applied.
We have shown that polices devoting higher resources to disadvantaged students typ-
ically lead to small individual benefits. However, it is difficult to compare these low
returns with those found for programs involving the whole population of students be-
cause individuals with different characteristics are likely to differ in terms of their pol-
icy responsiveness. In addition, as the underlying assumptions that have to be met in
order to obtain estimates of causal estimates differ across estimation methods, particu-
lar care must be paid when comparing evaluations using different approaches.Endnotes
1Early school leavers include both young people who have dropped out of school be-
fore the end of upper secondary education programs (dropouts) and individuals who
have never enrolled in those programs. This distinction somehow reflects that between
credentials and competences, which traces back to the distinction between the human
capital and signalling theories of the value of education. If getting a diploma produces a
signalling effect, the taxpayers’ financing of public compulsory education is partially
wasted when students drop out of the program.
2More and better education is associated to higher wages both in standard human cap-
ital models and in signalling models where education acts as a signal of valuable innate
abilities.
3We also notice that, if education signals certain characteristics that individuals have
(Spence 1974), a change in the pool of individuals acquiring a given educational level might
produce a change in the signalling value of the qualification and in the associated wage.
4With the growing consensus, doubts have also started to emerge. See for instance
Holmlund et al. 2011 and Brunello et al. 2013.
5Carneiro and Heckman 2002 have a more critical view and argue instead that high
estimated returns may be signaling that the selected instrument is not valid.
6Recently Devereux and Hart 2010 have re-estimated the returns to education in the
United Kingdom using both the same dataset (the General Household Survey) and the
same identification strategy as Oreopoulos. They find, however, much smaller returns
(3% on average).
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2007. See also Anspal et al. 2011, for Estonia.
8Both the Survey on the Health and Retirement of Europeans (SHARE) and the
EUSILC survey include self-reported health.
9Reviews of national policies implemented to reduce dropout rates are scarce. Cabus
and De Witte 2013, who cover The Netherlands, is an exception.
10Brunello et al. 2012b use the approach suggested by Hanushek and Wossmann and
find that in the sub-sample of European countries, early tracking significantly increases
average performance.
11In the Project STAR, 11,571 students (of 79 schools) in Tennessee (from 1985 to
1989) and their teachers were randomly assigned to a class of about 15 students while
others were assigned to a class of about 22 students (from kindergarten to third
grade).
12Other studies include Hoxby 2000, who investigates the effects of class size on stu-
dent achievement by relying on random population variations, and Case and Deaton
1999, who exploit the fact that the apartheid regime in South Africa did not allow black
people to move from one district to another. De Paola and Scoppa (2011) exploit ex-
ogenous variations in class size determined by a maximum class size rule introduced by
the 2001 Italian university reform and find negative effects on student achievement. De
Paola et al. 2013, relying on the random assignment of students to classes of different
size, show that large classes mainly affect low ability students.
13Positive effects emerge also on test scores, which might also translate in a reduction of
early school leaving.
14Under the assumption that the percentage gain in earnings observed at age 27 remains
constant over the lifecycle, they calculate that the present value of earnings gains from a
class size reduction is $9,460 per student (in 2009 dollars). They assume a 3% annual
discount rate and discount all earnings streams back to the point of the intervention. They
estimate the average cost per child of reducing class size by 33% for 2.14 years (the mean
treatment duration for STAR students) at $9,355. According to these calculations, the
benefits of reducing class size slightly outweigh the costs.
15An early attempt is the classical study by Card and Krueger 1992.
16See for example Rockoff (2004) and De Paola (2009).
17The study is based on survey data (face-to-face interviews with both the parents
and the children and follow-up annual telephone interviews with the children). Data
were collected both for eligible and ineligible individuals in pilot and control areas.
Information includes: the youngster’s current economic activity, the family income, par-
ental economic activity, occupation, and education, childhood events (such as ill health
and mobility), and prior school achievement. In addition the study uses administrative
data on the quality of schooling in the relevant neighborhood and other measures of
neighborhood quality measured prior to the introduction of EMA.
18No relevant differences between males and females were detected. The effect of
EMA was estimated to be largest for children with lower levels of prior educational
achievement. In addition, the effect was larger for children in rented accommodation
(who are more likely to be liquidity constrained) that for children living in owner-
occupied housing, although the difference was not statistically significant.
19Plus a small number of high schools.
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in place and for medium-high ability pupils within disadvantaged schools.
21Other studies have evaluated the effect of student involvement in extracurricular
activities. These activities might help in developing skills, such as teamwork ability,
self-confidence, taste for competition, that are relevant in many contexts. Eide and
Roman 2001 analyse the impact of sport participation on educational attainment. Their
identification strategy relies on an instrumental variable approach in which sport par-
ticipation is instrumented with height at age 16. They do not find any effect of sport ac-
tivities on high school dropout rates. The same instrument is used by Pfeifer and
Cornelißen 2010, who use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and show that
sport participation has a positive effect on educational attainment. However, the validity
of the adopted instrument is questionable since height is correlated both to education
and to earnings conditional on education (see for example Persico et al. 2004; Case
et al. 2009; Guven and Lee 2013). Lipscomb 2007 uses a fixed effect estimation strategy
and finds that athletic participation is associated with a two percent increase in math
and science test scores.
22Unfortunately, this point is often ignored by several EU member states.
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